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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-Bank Paying Depositor's Check Mter
His Adjudication in Bankruptcy Is Liable to
Trustee for Amount of Check-Bank of
Marin v. England*
Prior to filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, which is an
automatic adjudication of bankruptcy,1 depositor delivered five
checks to Eureka Fisheries drawn upon depositor's account in appellant Bank of Marin. Six days after the filing, Eureka Fisheries presented the checks to appellant and received payment. Appellee,
depositor's trustee in bankruptcy, did not notify appellant of the
bankruptcy proceedings until after appellant had honored the checks.
An order was sought by appellee from the referee in bankruptcy
requiring appellant, or in the alternative Eureka Fisheries, to return
the amount of the honored checks to the bankrupt's estate. The
referee issued the requested order, and his ruling that appellant
and Eureka Fisheries were jointly liable was affirmed by the bankruptcy court. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed. After
an adjudication in bankruptcy, a bank has no authorization to pay
any checks drawn by a bankrupt depositor, since, upon adjudication, all of the bankrupt's property vests by operation of law in the
trustee; 2 when checks are honored after adjudication, a bank is
liable to restore the sum paid out of the bankrupt's account even
if the bank did not receive notice of the adjudication. 3
• 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 906 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
principal case].
I. "The filing of a voluntary petition under chapters I to 7 of this title, other
than a petition filed in behalf of a partnership by less than all of the partners, shall
operate as an adjudication with the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication."
Bankruptcy Act § 18(£), as amended, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), II U.S.C. § 41(£) (1964).
" 'Adjudication' shall mean a determination, whether by decree or by operation of
law, that a person is bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act § 1(2), as amended, 73 Stat. 109
(1959), II U.S.C. § 1(2) (1964).
The provision that filing is an automatic adjudication is not a significant change
in the law. Previously it was necessary for a judge to make a formal order of adjudication but as a practical matter this generally followed automatically upon the
filing. E.g., In re Howe, 235 Fed. 908, 909 (D. Mass 1916), afj'd sub nom. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts, 241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam). The amendment eliminated the administrative burden involved in requiring an adjudication by
a judge. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1J 18.01[3.6] (14th ed. 1964); s. REP. No. 320, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
2. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt •.. shall .•. be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this title . • . to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . • . . (5) property, including rights of action, which prior
to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, II U.S.C. § IIO(a)
(1964).
•
3. Although in the principal case the bank was held jointly liable with Eureka
Fisheries, Eureka paid the entire claim to the trustee and filed a claim for contribution against the bank. The rights between these parties had not been determined at
the time of the decision in the principal case. Principal case at 188, 193 n.12.
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Aside from the principal case, the only other reported case
dealing with the liability under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 of
a bank which honored checks of a depositor after adjudication
is Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 4 in which the court
held that "a bank is not liable when in good faith and without
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy it honors the bankrupt's check
in the regular course of its business . . . ." 5 The Rosenthal court
relied on a proviso to section 70(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act which
stated: "That nothing in this title shall impair the negotiability of
currency or negotiable instruments." 6 The court said that one of the
purposes of this previously uninterpreted provision was to protect
banks in post-adjudication transactions. 7 The basis for this interpretation of legislative intent, however, was not indicated; in fact,
the finding was made in spite of the section's introductory language
which indicates that it applies only to transactions after bankruptcy
but before adjudication. 8 The court in the principal case rejected
the Rosenthal interpretation; reliance on the "negotiability" clause
was deemed unwarranted in light of this introductory language,
and because the presentation of a check by a payee for payment by
a drawee bank is not considered a negotiation. 9
In addition to its attempted use of the Rosenthal decision as controlling authority, appellant bank suggested that the trustee should
be barred from recovery on a theory of !aches or estoppel because of
his failure to give appellant notice of depositor's bankruptcy before
the checks were honored. The Bankruptcy Act places a duty on the
trustee to gather the property of the bankrupt "as expeditiously as
is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest." 10 The
trustee has been held liable for losses incurred by the estate through
his negligence11 and he has been denied recovery of interest on
funds which he had advanced to pay expenses when he had improp4. 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
5. Id. at 736. (Emphasis added.)
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5)
(1964): "Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of section 44 of this title, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of
bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, That nothing in this
title shall impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments."
7. Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 730, 736 (W.D. La. 1956).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d) (1964):
"After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession
of the property of the bankrupt . . . ."
9. Principal case at 189. It should further be noted that the following cases, cited
in Rosenthal for the proposition that a bank paying checks in good faith without
knowledge of pending bankruptcy proceedings, were all cases involving a payment
by a bank before adjudication. Citizens Union Nat'! Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527,
31 A.L.R. 256 (6th Cir. 1923); Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp.
409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Cunningham v. Lexington Trust Co., 259 Mass. 181, 156 N.E.
1, 54 A.L.R. 751 (1927).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 47(a)(l), 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 75(a)(l) (1964).
11. In re India Wharf Brewery, Inc., 96 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1938).
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erly delayed in administering the estate.12 However, no case can be
found in which the trustee was precluded from recovering property
belonging to the estate of the bankrupt on a theory of estoppel or
!aches because of either the trustee's delay in securing the property
or his failure to give timely notice to interested parties of the adjudication.13 The assumption that such a defense would be available
would seemingly run counter to the provisions of section 70(d)
which specifically mention those transactions which are safe from
the trustee's attack. 14
The statutory protection of certain transactions taking place
after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy was necessitated by the
inconsistent judicial interpretations of the language of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 15 In its original form the Act provided that "the
trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall ... be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was
adjudged a bankrupt."16 In their desire to prevent depletion of the
bankrupt's estate before the adjudication, courts expanded the scope
12. Brown v. Leo, 34 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1929).
13. If such a defense is available to appellant, the question still remains as to
whether appellee's failure in the principal case to notify appellant within six days
of the filing of the petition is such an unreasonable delay as to bar recovery. The
court in the principal case did not deal with this question. It should also be pointed
out that a trustee in bankruptcy could never give notice prior to an adjudication
since he is not appointed until the first meeting of the creditors after the adjudication. Bankruptcy Act § 44(a), 52 Stat. 860 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72(a) (1964).
14. Principal case at 191. Other defenses proved equally unavailing to the appellant. A claim that it was protected by a California statute allowing a bank to cash
checks in disregard of adverse claims to bank deposits until a court order was issued
prohibiting such payment was held inapplicable since the claim of the trustee in
bankruptcy is not an adverse claim within the meaning of the statute. Appellant's
other arguments, that it was deprived of property without due process of law since it
had not received notice of the bankruptcy proceedings and that it was required to
make a double pa}ment of a debt, were also rejected. Id. at 192-93. These constitutional arguments have not been directly considered by the Supreme Court in the context of a situation such as the one presented in the principal case, and the decisions
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), cited by appellant in support of his arguments are distinguishable. Moyses dealt with the right of a creditor to reasonable
notice of bankruptcy proceedings while Mullane considered the rights of trust beneficiaries to notice of proceedings dealing with the trustee's settlement of accounts. In
both of these proceedings the parties held to be entitled to notice had rights and
interests in the funds which were the subject of the proceedings and were entitled
to their day in court to assert and protect those rights and interests. In the principal
case, the bank was merely a debtor of the bankrupt and as such had no comparable
interest. The principal case would thus seem to fall clearly within the rule of Mueller
v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I (1902), that title to a bankrupt's property vests in the bankruptcy trustee and is under the control of the bankruptcy court. The Mueller court
did not concern itself as to whether notice to a bankrupt's debtors was necessary.
15. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 394, 398, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 917 (1955); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1J 70.66; WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY
LAw OF 1938 161 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1937); Hearings
on Revision of the Bankruptcy Act Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 211-12 (1937).
16• .Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898).
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of the provision and held that the trustee's title, though vesting
upon adjudication, related back so as to embrace all of the property
the bankrupt had at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed. 17
The filing of the petition was deemed "a caveat to all the world,
and in effect an attachment and injunction." 18 If this interpretation were carried to its logical extreme, all transfers of a bankrupt's
property subsequent to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy would
have to be invalidated. Obviously this would produce harsh results
where a party dealt with the bankrupt in good faith and without
knowledge of the filing. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult
for a party against whom a petition has been filed to conduct even
those business operations which would not deplete the estate since
others would be reluctant to deal with him in light of the potential
invalidity of all property transfers. The courts recognized these inequities, and, in an attempt to protect bona fide transactions taking
place between filing and adjudication, began to retreat from the
unwavering use of the filing date as the cut-off point. 19
The courts, however, failed to establish a clear pattern of exceptions and the resulting uncertainty led to the passage of the Chandler Act in 1938, in which Congress (I) amended the Bankruptcy Act
to provide that title to the estate of a bankrupt vests in the trustee
on the date on which the petition in bankruptcy is filed, 20 and (2)
specifically enumerated the transactions between filing and adjudication which were to be protected.21 Section 70(d) excepted transactions occurring "after bankruptcy and either before adjudication
or before a receiver takes possession of the property of the bankrupt" when a bankrupt's property is transferred in good faith for a
"present fair equivalent value." 22 Also, protected were persons who,
being indebted to or holding property of the bankrupt, pay such
indebtedness or deliver such property in good faith to the bankrupt
or to his order. 23 The only provision explicitly exempting transactions occurring after adjudication is found in section 2l(g) which
deals with transfers of real property. 24 Finally, section 70(d) pro17. Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1913); Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman
Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 307 (1911); State Bank v. Cox, 143 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1906);
4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1f 70.66; MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 169 (1956).
18. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I, 14 (1902).
19. Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925); Citizens Union
Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186 Fed. 84 (2d Cir.
1911); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 11 70.66; McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bank•
ruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REv. 583, 612-16 (1927).
20. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ ll0(a) (1964). See text of Act at note 2 supra.
21. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d) (1964).
22. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(l), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(d)(l)
(1964).
23. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(2), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(2)
(1964).
24. Bankruptcy Act § 2l(g), added by 52 Stat. 853 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
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vides that only those transactions specifically excepted therein or
mentioned in section 2I(g) would be valid as against the trustee.25
Both before and after the enactment of section 70(d), courts have
held that a party can be required to return to the trustee property of
a bankrupt received after adjudication.26 The banks in the principal
case and Rosenthal did not receive property of the bankrupt, but
section 70(d) has been interpreted as placing an absolute ban on all
transfers of a bankrupt's property after adjudication, except as specifically exempted. 27 Such an interpretation would seem to support
the view taken in the principal case that, although a party has not
received property of the bankrupt, if his actions, albeit in good
faith, have resulted in the improper removal of property from the
bankrupt's estate, he may be liable to the trustee to the extent of the
depletion.
If the property is distributed subsequent to removal, the party
responsible for the depletion in the bankrupt's estate may be forced
to use his own property to replace the removed property even
though it is unlikely that he will obtain reimbursement from the
bankrupt party or the party to whom the property was distributed.
Such a situation occurred in the principal case and the analogous case
of Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co.28 In Lake, five insurers, without
knowledge of the prior filing of a bankruptcy petition and in reliance on the bankrupt's claim of title to life insurance policies, lent
the bankrupt approximately $45,000 on the policies, taking assignments of the policies as security.29 When the trustee in bankruptcy
discovered the policies and the loans, he gave the bankrupt an opportunity to exercise his right to retain the policies by paying into
the estate their cash surrender values. 30 When the bankrupt refused
25. Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), added by 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5)
(1964). This clause ends with the proviso that the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments is not to be impaired.
26. Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961); In re Howe, 235
Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), aff'd sub nom. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts,
241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam).
27. Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1961);
Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1959); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218
F.2d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1955); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1111 70.67-.68. One early
case under Pennsylvania bankruptcy law held, on facts similar to those in the principal case, a bank liable for payment of a check after the depositor was adjudged
bankrupt. Wickersham v. Nicholson, 14 Serg. & R. ll8 (Pa. 1826). Pre-Chandler Act
cases give no indication that any transactions occurring subsequent to adjudication
would be protected. In re Howe, 235 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), aff'd sub nom. Edison
Electric Illuminating Co. v. Tibbetts, 241 Fed. 468 (1st Cir. 1917) (per curiam). See
Citizens Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923); In re Zotti, 186
Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 1911); Stevens v. .Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1931).
28. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1955).
29. The bankrupt in fact had misrepresented to the insurer that no bankruptcy
proceedings were outstanding against him.
30. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5)
(1964).
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to exercise this right, the trustee sued the insurers for the cash
surrender value of the policies, an amount slightly in excess of the
amount of the loans. The policies remained physically in the
possession of the bankrupt, but the court found that the receiver
had taken actual possession of the bankrupt's property before the
loan was made, and that the insurers could not rely on section
70(d) to protect their receipt of the assignment of the policies.
Although it recognized the plight of the insurers, the court held that
the statute invalidated all transfers of property not granted specific.
protection, and ordered the insurers to pay the cash surrender values
of the policies to the trustee. Thus, the insurers were forced to pay
both the loans and the cash surrender values-approximately twice
_the value of the policy-without any assurance that they would be
able to recover the loan from the bankrupt.31 The court did not feel
it was competent to answer the question of whether the limited
protection set out by Congress was the best solution to the problem
of the validity of transactions affecting a bankrupt's property after
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.32 In Lake, as in the principal
case, the court felt bound by the statutory limits prescribed by
Congress.83
The court in Rosenthal avoided the above result by placing the
bank under the protection of the proviso against the impairment of
the negotiability of negotiable instruments.34 This approach, which
was rejected in the principal case,35 was criticized by commentators
since the payment of a check by a drawee bank is not a negotiation,
and thus to hold a bank liable for cashing checks of a depositor
31. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1955). The debt
of the bankrupt to the insurer for the loan was presumably not affected by a discharge of the bankrupt policy holder as the loan was obtained by false representations. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(2), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)
(1964). Of course, the survival of a right of action after bankruptcy carries no assurances of a recovery.
32. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 31, at 399.
33. In 1955 following the decision in Lake the insurance industry attempted to
have Congress change the Bankruptcy Act so as to protect insurance companies which
made payments on policies after adjudication when they had no knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceedings. S. 1998, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) would have amended
§ 70(a)(5) by adding the following to the end of the clause:
And provided further, That when any insurance company, either before or after
the adjudication of bankruptcy, in good faith and without actual knowledge of
bankruptcy, makes any payment pursuant to the provisions of a life insurance
policy or contract, such payment shall have the same effect so far as such company is concerned as if the bankruptcy were not pending.
S. 1999, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) would have amended § 70(d)(5) to provide that
a good faith payment on a policy by an insurer without actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy would be a valid transfer as against the trustee. The National Bankruptcy Conference adopted a resolution opposing the proposed amendments. Resolution No. 28, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, 1956
MEETING, at 12. The amendments were never enacted by the Congress.
34. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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after his adjudication is not to impair the negotiability of the
check. 30 It has been suggested that the "negotiability" clause was
included to avoid any implication that the restrictions in the Bankruptcy Act modified the law of negotiable instruments37 and to
protect the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.38 As a drawee bank is not a holder in due course, it would
not be within the intended scope of protection.39 Therefore, the
Rosenthal interpretation affords banks a special protection which
neither the express language of the statute nor its legislative history
indicates they were intended to have. 40
Not only does the Rosenthal interpretation lack statutory support, but it might, in fact, have broader implications than was
realized by the court which expounded it. If the interpretation
which protects the bank in the present situation were accepted,
there would not be any valid reason for not applying the same
rationale to a situation in which a debt owing to the bankrupt was
paid after the adjudication of bankruptcy but was not paid to the
bankrupt's estate. The employer who pays wages earned prior to
bankruptcy after an adjudication would seemingly be entitled to
the same protection that the bank receives under Rosenthal. Indeed,
the employer would probably have less reason to know of or suspect
bankruptcy proceedings than a bank that surveys legal publications
which announce such proceedings. However, the language of the
Bankruptcy Act does not protect such transactions.
Courts have said that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a
caveat to the whole world, and that all property of the bankrupt is
thereafter in custodia legis-beyond the power of the bankrupt to
transfer. 41 Therefore, once a petition is filed, the bank's obligation
to pay the bankrupt's check would be extinguished, for the funds in
the bank would be the trustee's funds rather than the bankrupt's.42
36. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, at 1502 n.3; Seligson, Creditors Rights, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 708, 730-31 (1957). Payment of a check by a drawee bank is not a
negotiation. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Marion Nat'l Bank, 116 Ind. App. 453, 64
N.E.2d 583, 589 (1946); BRITTON, B1u.s & NoTES 118 (2d ed. 1961).

37. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1502.
38. Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 548, 550 (1957); Note, 64 HARV, L. REv. 958, 965 (1951).
39. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. General Finance Corp., 297 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.
1961).
40. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1502 n.3.
41. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 4 (1902); Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d
654, 656 (10th Cir. 1961); Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658, 660
(2d Cir. 1940); In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D. N.J. 1955).
That the bank was not a party to the adjudication proceedings made no difference
as the adjudication in bankruptcy is a proceeding in rem and binds all parties in
interest whether or not they appear at the proceedings. Myers v. International Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 64, 73 (1923); Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 248
(1919); 2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1[ 18.43.
42. Harrison State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Neb. 456, 218 N.W. 92 (1928);
Guthrie Nat'! Bank v. Gill, 6 Okla. 560, 54 Pac. 434 (1898); BRADY, BANK CHECKS 25
(3d ed. 1962); The Law of Bank Check-General Principles, 78 BANKING L.J. 277, 301
(1961); see NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 329 (1948).
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The bank may argue that this imposes an undue burden, since it is
not commercially feasible to verify the financial standing of the
drawer of every check as each check is presented for payment. The
difficulty is compounded by the fact that a bankruptcy petition filed
anywhere in the United States has the same effect in all courts as it
has in the court in which it is filed. 43 As compared with the bank's
burden, the burden which would be placed on a trustee by requiring him to give notice to the bank of pending bankruptcies appears
relatively insignificant. The disparity of these burdens, however,
did not persuade the court in the principal case, because the court
thought that various legal publications and modern communications
allow a bank to keep abreast of bankruptcy proceedings without
great inconvenience. Furthermore, the danger of bankruptcies is
merely another risk of doing business and whatever cost might be
involved can be passed on to the customers. In any event, even if the
bank has difficulties in keeping abreast of bankruptcy petitions, the
infrequency ·with which this problem arises, as is evidenced by the
fact that the principal case and Rosenthal are the only reported
cases in which the question arose, seems to indicate that the banks
are not terribly threatened by the imposition of this liability.44
Consideration must also be given to the process of administering
a bankrupt's estate and the objectives sought to be achieved in such
a proceeding. In order to prevent depletion of the bankrupt's estate
and to distribute the bankrupt's assets equitably among his creditors, the Bankruptcy Act places full control over the estate in the
court at a particular point in time.45 With few exceptions, the point
in time is the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.46 If a court were
to extend protection to transactions other than those specifically
excepted by the statute, it would subject the bankrupt's estate to
further depletion and prevent the trustee from gaining effective
control of the estate until he had given specific notice, not required
by the statute, to those parties who are likely to deal with the bankrupt's property. 47 Since the trustee is not appointed until after the
adjudication of bankruptcy, such notice could never be given before
adjudication,48 and the Congressional mandate as to the point of
time for the vesting of property in the trustee would be frustrated
to the detriment of the creditors. A bank, such as the one in the
principal case, may have been acting in good faith, but when a
43. Principal case at 190.
44. Id. at 190-91.
45. Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 307 (1911); In Te
Ostlind Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Ore. 1937); In Te Jones, 10 F. Supp. 165,
167 (W.D. Mo. 1935); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, 1) 70.66; MACLACHLAN, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 346.
46. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
47. See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 548 (1957).
48. See note 13 supra.
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choice must be made between the bank and the creditors in deter
mining who should bear the loss from the bank's mistaken payment,
both the existing law and policy indicate that a creditor who is not
in a position to prevent the payment should be protected.

